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Cybersecurity is a growing landscape, in terms of careers and conflict. Federal 
agencies and private companies are attempting to hire as many qualified cyber 
professionals as they can to meet the demand of securing this new domain. 
Veterans are steadily leaving the military for civilian life. Hiring managers need to 
find qualified employees and veterans need to find post-military employment, but 
there is no clear path to connect the potential supply with the actual demand.  
This thesis researches modern developments in security concepts for 
forward deployed military personnel and connects those concepts to 
cybersecurity. A survey of the available jobs in cybersecurity creates another 
layer of traceability followed by identification of related technical skills identified 
as potential gaps for potential hires. The gaps help identify available sources of 
training and certification that can help the veterans fill the gaps. The end result is 
a matrix that identifies that specific security concepts of perimeter defense for 
forward operating bases and combat outposts do correlate to cybersecurity roles 
and that the technical skills required are fully covered by existing training. A 
roadmap is discussed to synchronize federal efforts around a training program to 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In order to improve the ability to offer combat veterans an opportunity to 
continue serving the nation through continued federal service employment as a 
cybersecurity professional, the federal government needs to create additional 
training and transition opportunities. At this time, there are no programs designed 
to inform veterans of the value that their current skills in security can bring to the 
cyber field or augment those skills through training to address potential technical 
barriers to success in the cyber domain. These technical barriers may be 
perceived by the veteran or a hiring manager as insurmountable obstacles to 
success. Furthermore, while training is available to fill the technical skill gaps, 
there is no clear path for veterans’ transition to federal career roles available in 
cybersecurity.  
B. BACKGROUND 
1. The Current Hiring Environment 
Cybersecurity is one of the fastest growing sectors in public and private 
service. Almost every U.S. government department is hiring professionals as 
quickly as possible. Though the federal hiring process can be cumbersome, it is 
designed to elevate the highest qualified personnel to the eyes of the hiring 
manager and it does allow for preference to be shown to specific classes of 
individuals. Among those groups receiving preferential hiring treatment are 
veterans, who receive between five and 30 preference points depending on their 
service. Veterans are entering the civilian workforce at an increasing rate, leaving 
a military that has been at war for a full decade. This extended state of war has 
led to several refinements in operating methodology, especially in the area of 
operating forward operating bases (FOB) and combat outposts (CO) to support 
counterinsurgency efforts. Many of the skills required to implement these 
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operational innovations, particularly those associated with physical security, 
conceptually align with high-demand cybersecurity skills.  
Some departments are granted special hiring authorities that allow for 
direct hire, enabling them to avoid competition in order to fill positions quickly. 
While the process was not designed to undermine veteran preference, it does 
allow for it. This can lead to a hiring culture that views veterans in a negative light 
and may foster preconceptions that veterans lack the technical skills necessary 
to be of service in a cyber mission space. 
2. What Can Veterans Offer to the Cyber Mission? 
Over the past decade, forward deployed operating units (particularly 
infantry) have had to adapt to an operating climate unlike any other in the 200-
plus years of military history in America. Veterans have had ingrained into them a 
concept of security that literally kept them alive. This concept of security is broad 
in its application, and cybersecurity is one of the newer domains for which this 
concept can be relevant. 
This thesis provides a preliminary analysis of the security skillsets of 
veterans against the skill gaps in cybersecurity for the purpose of designing a 
manageable path for integration of veterans into the cybersecurity workforce. The 
focus of the analysis starts with the concepts of security rather than the technical 
implementations of those concepts. This analysis provides the basis for a 
proposed training program to transition veterans out of military service into 
civilian service, while capturing lessons from the field that can be applied to 
improve security in the cyber domain. 
Chapter II reviews documented military regulations and best practices for 
security of a FOB or CO. Requirements or designs for future improvements to 
combat outpost security are also discussed. Security concepts identified in these 
document reviews is then correlated with a real world case example from the 
investigation into Combat Outpost Keating in Afghanistan. The security concepts 
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identified in this chapter are used again in Chapter IV for comparison with the 
findings from Chapter III.  
Chapter III reviews security concepts of a computer network with 
examples from federal, military and academic sources of security requirements.  
Chapter IV compares the views of combat and cyber with basic security 
concepts to illustrate the connection between the two domains. Further 
discussion of federal cyber jobs and their required skill sets is provided to 
annotate differences in security implementation. Establishing traceability from the 
skills for cyber jobs back to the security principle learned serving in a FOB or CO 
will form the basis for training gaps to be discussed in Chapter V. 
The link established in Chapter IV between skills required for cyber jobs 
and skills learned during service at a FOB or CO form the basis for training gaps 
discussed in Chapter V. This chapter reviews the training goals of several 
commercial certification programs to determine if those programs fill the training 
gap established in Chapter IV.  
Chapter VI briefly summarizes the preceding chapters and provides a 
tabular view of physical security and cybersecurity concepts, the associated job 
skills, and identified training sources for attainment of those skills. Finally, this 
chapter provides a suggested roadmap for implementation of a pilot program for 
incorporation of this training into the military transition process. 
 4
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II. SURVEY OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION MODELS USED FOR 
COMBAT OUTPOSTS AND FORWARD OPERATING BASES  
This chapter details developments in FOB and CO security models to 
include advancements in tactics, techniques, procedures and technology used to 
provide or increase protection for physical locations.  
A. FORWARD OPERATING BASE/COMBAT OUTPOST  
Over the past decade of military operations, FOBs and COs have been 
the basic security construct for deployed forces. A FOB is typically a brigade or 
battalion sized military base constructed within an area of operations (AO) in a 
host nation. COs are any base smaller than a FOB that are also deployed within 
the AO. There is a clear relationship of command and communication between 
FOBs and COs in an AO.  
COs are small, reinforced observation posts that can host a company or 
platoon sized unit plus support personnel to secure and operate the base. They 
are located in areas of strategic importance to providing security in an AO. COs 
provide a place to interact with the local population and provide safety for the unit 
conducting counterinsurgency operations from the base.  
U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, 
Chapter 6-30 ascribes the following roles to a CO [1]: 
 Secure key lines of communication or infrastructure 
 Secure and co-opt the local populace 
 Gather intelligence 
 Assist the government in restoring essential service  
 Force insurgents to operate elsewhere 
The Joint Army/Marine Corps Glossary of Operational Terms and 
Graphics defines a perimeter in context of defense as “a defense without an 
exposed flank, consisting of forces deployed along the perimeter of the defended 
area” [2]. The use of the words “without an exposed flank” combined with the 
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idea of a compound is similar to the mathematical definition of the outside edge 
of an area. In order to not have an exposed flank, the perimeter fully encloses the 
area to be defended and separates it from the area of the threat. Thus, the 
defended area is inside the perimeter, and the perimeter consists of a continuous 
line of demarcation around the area to be defended [3].  
In keeping with this generally accepted understanding of the term, the 
following working definition for “perimeter” will be used throughout this paper: the 
continuous line of demarcation around a secure physical space that is intended 
to separate and protect friendly forces from non-friendly and provides a vantage 
point for security to observe, detect, identify, and engage non-friendly forces.  
Field Manual 3-24.2 describes 12 planning considerations for perimeter 
defense as summarized in Table 1. All of the planning considerations are 
designed to enhance a perimeter to maximize the defense posture and protection 
provided to the inhabitants.  
 
Planning Consideration Example Planning 
Consideration 
Example 
Terrain Natural obstacles, roads, 
waterways
Defense in Depth Fall back points, 
portable obstacles
Host Nation Security 
Forces 
Local police; military 
forces
Patrols Roaming patrols, 
checkpoints, dogs
Communication Internal communications 
network to TOC
Maximum use of 
Offensive Action 
Military tactics to rid 
area of enemy force 
Sustainment Available landing 
zones/drop zones for 
resupply
Mutual Support Overlapping fields of 
observation, 
coordinate fire 
Protection Fire response, chemical 
suppression, medical 
support
All Around Defense 360 degree perimeter 
Security Ground sensors, cameras Responsiveness Counter attack plans to 
various scenarios, 
quick reaction force 
Table 1.   Planning Considerations for Combat Outpost Security, from [1] 
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Sections 6-121, 6-122 and 6-129 of the Offense and Defense FM highlight 
the importance of perimeter defense [3]:  
 A perimeter defense is oriented in all directions. The prerequisites 
for a successful perimeter defense are aggressive patrolling and 
security operations outside the perimeter.  
 A major characteristic of a perimeter defense is a secure inner area 
with most of the combat power located on the perimeter.  
 The commander reduces vulnerabilities by: developing 
reconnaissance and surveillance plans that provide early warning  
B. COMBAT OUTPOST SECURITY DESIGN 
Figure 1 illustrates a typical defense design for a CO. In this typical 
design, there are identifiable security concepts that are required for every base.  
 
Figure 1.  Typical U.S. Combat Outpost Design, from [1] 
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1. Control Points 
Starting on the left of the figure, traffic control points are placed in all 
directions of CO approach that allow for the inspection and redirection of vehicles 
and people. These traffic control points are in place on the side of the CO with 
the main entrance. The main entrance has an area for a parking lot and a 
serpentine obstacle that prevents vehicles from approaching the primary gate to 
the CO itself.  
Gates in the perimeter serve as an entry control points (ECP) for the CO. 
ECPs are the only way in and out of the CO and are the areas where individuals 
are checked for identification and inspection prior to entering the compound. As a 
designed ingress/egress point, ECPs are heavily fortified with continuing 
serpentine positions into the perimeter. There are also reaction forces positioned 
nearby for armed response as required. Also located at the ECP is a machine 
gun position to provide protection and overwatch for the manning force at the 
gate. The security concept employed at traffic control points and entry control 
points is controlled ingress and egress. Controlled ingress and egress allows for 
identification and inspection of everything approaching or crossing the perimeter 
at the allowed points.  
2. Perimeter Monitoring 
a. Manned 
The perimeter requires monitoring at more than just the allowed points of 
entry. All four corners of the perimeter have a watch tower positioned to give the 
force a 360 degree field of observation outside the outpost. The 360 degree field 
of observation extends outward from the outpost into an area security zone 150 
meters from the perimeter. The security zone is immediately adjacent to the 
perimeter and must be observed closely for any threats. The future designs 
(depicted in Figure 2) for COs call for an area of interest and an area of 
influence. The area of interest is a 360 degree field extending out to 20 times the  
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length of the perimeter (e.g., 400 meter perimeter has an 8000 meter area of 
interest). The area of influence is half of the area of interest (e.g., 4000 meters in 
the previous example) [4].  
 
Figure 2.  Operational View of Future Force Protection, from [4] 
The areas of interest and influence are intended to support observation 
and detection of movement around the CO without undue burden on the peaceful 
populace, which is assumed to approach the outpost from the controlled 
positions and to also give the outpost a wide berth if there is no intent to interact 
with it. Once a target has entered the area of influence, there must be the 
capability (in accordance with established rules of engagement) to deter the 
target from approaching the perimeter in an unsafe manner. Obvious threats 
(e.g., people or vehicles approaching at high rate of speed while bearing arms) 
can typically be neutralized with direct engagement. Less obvious threats can be 
observed and situationally marked for engagement, or issued commands or 
communications to deter their actions as required.  
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b. Unmanned 
In addition to the manned posts at the corners of the perimeter, the typical 
design calls for unmanned monitoring capabilities. Figure 1 shows infrared 
cameras with placements at the center of the perimeter sides that do not have a 
gate. These unmanned cameras are connected to the CO’s Tactical Operations 
Center (TOC) where their images can be monitored in real-time by a watch 
officer.  
The future CO design of Figure 2 further describes a series of unmanned 
ground sensors placed throughout the areas of interest and influence. These 
sensors will also be monitored by the TOC watchstanders and will provide 
targeting information to remote weapons systems that will use the sensor data to 
apply fires with precision munitions per the rules of engagement. These 
capabilities can be threaded together by the TOC to create an automated 
response capability that increases security and protection to the manned units 
within the outpost.  
3. Buildings 
a. Living Quarters 
Living quarters are an obvious requirement for any size installation 
housing military personnel. For FOBs and COs, living quarters present a unique 
challenge balancing access and protection. Living quarters need to be spaced 
and protected properly from other buildings, the perimeter, ammunition supply 
points (ASP), and ECPs. Spacing is critical to enhance protection, but must also 
support quick response and deployment of troops in the living quarters to their 
battle stations. The typical design depicted in Figure 1 shows how the living 
areas are placed far away from the primary gate with obstacles placed between 
the primary gate and the building to protect from explosions and shrapnel. Future 
designs incorporate overhead cover to protect from mortars and grenades as 
well.  
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b. Tactical Operations Center Command Post 
The TOC is the headquarters and office space for the CO. It houses the 
command, control, communications, and computers for the outpost and 
represents a high value target for an enemy force. As seen in the typical design, 
it is protected similarly to the living quarters. Additional obstacles are placed 
between the primary gate and the TOC. The TOC communicates tactically with 
each unmanned or automated system deployed in the area. 
c. Fuel and Ammunition Supply Points 
Fuel or ASPs are required to support the missions of the CO. Fuel supply 
points are where combustible fuel is stored to run generators, vehicles, and any 
other combustion engine that requires it. ASPs house the ammunition for every 
weapon deployed to the outpost, all of which require readily available 
ammunition. The ammunition supply point must be accessible to the stationary 
weapons systems deployed within an outpost (i.e., mortar pits). Fuel and ASPs 
must also be stationed far enough away from the living quarters and TOC to 
protect those structures in the event of detonation or explosion due to incoming 
enemy fire. The appropriate minimum standoff distance between structures is an 
important element of outpost design.  
C. REAL WORLD APPLICATION OF OUPOST DESIGN 
In July 2006, the U.S. Army established Combat Outpost Keating in the 
Kamdesh Province of Afghanistan. The CO was located 25 kilometers from the 
Pakistani border in a basin surrounded by high ground and water. A review of 
declassified and redacted materials available through United States Central 
Command’s electronic reading room for information releasable under the 
Freedom of Information Act provides an opportunity to identify the previously 
described design principles used at CO Keating. Figure 3 illustrates a defensive 
plan for CO Keating that employs security cameras, and a series of weapons 
placements to provide 360 degrees of coverage with mortar, grenade, or 




Figure 3.  Defensive Diagram for CO Keating, from [6] 
1. Control Points 
This diagram illustrates the perimeter made of triple strand concertina wire 
(red line). There was one primary ECP in the perimeter (marked with two 
Claymore mine symbols). The primary ECP was to the north (right side of 
diagram) and provides coverage of a main meeting building used for greeting 
locals and access to a bridge.  
2. Perimeter Monitoring 
a. Manned 
There are examples of manned and unmanned perimeter monitoring 
capabilities shown in this design. These include three stations manned 24 hours 
a day and three stations manned twice a day on an irregular schedule or during 
contact with the enemy to keep any observing enemy wary of the force protection 
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condition at any one time. One of the manned positions was built into the ECP 
building. The others were two HMMWV vehicles outfitted with the latest Long 
Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3) capabilities. These tools 
gave scouts the ability to detect, recognize, identify, and geo-locate distant 
targets in real-time, day or night [5]. The three irregularly manned positions were 
trucks outfitted with .50 caliber machine guns or Mk19 grenade launchers. While 
there were plans to erect towers to replace the vehicles, the vehicles had the 
capability to reposition themselves within the perimeter to provide coverage for 
dead space in the event of a firefight [6].  
b. Unmanned 
Unmanned capabilities are represented by white security camera icons 
throughout the CO. Each of the cameras was wired back to the TOC for 
centralized monitoring. Claymore mines can also be considered unmanned 
capabilities, in that they are designed to explode and kill personnel who engage 
their tripwire. Claymores were deployed at the ECP to prevent personnel from 
going around the approved entrance and at the southern end of the perimeter to 
protect the mortar pits.  
3. Buildings 
The force protection brief for CO Keating includes Figure 4 and helps 
illustrate the security design concepts for building location and separation.  
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Figure 4.  Force Protection Planning Diagram, Zoomed In, from [6] 
a. Living Quarters and Tactical Operations Center 
The TOC for CO Keating was located at the bright yellow star near the 
center of Figure 4 (for orientation purposes, north is toward the top of this figure). 
The TOC was separate from, but in close proximity to, the barracks for 3rd 
Platoon (directly to the west) and 2nd Platoon (directly to the east). There was 
also an overflow barracks directly south of 2nd Platoon, and a headquarters 
building. Each of these buildings was protected by several of the 577 Hesco 
structures within the CO. Hesco structures are modular barriers erected in 
austere conditions to serve a variety of purposes, but specifically serve as 
exterior blast barriers for the buildings in CO Keating.  
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b. Fuel or Ammunition Supply Points 
The fuel supply point and ASP could be found near the ECP on the 
northwest side of the perimeter. The location of these two supply points 
demonstrate the standoff distance as a defensive concept designed into this 
outpost. The supply points are located far enough away from the housing and 
work buildings to protect them from accidental or unintended detonation or 
explosion. The fuel supply point is located adjacent to the ECP, which would 
provide for efficient fueling of incoming and outgoing vehicles. The ASP is 
located where it can support troops requiring small arms ammunition prior to 
leaving the perimeter on patrol or to resupply the mounted machine guns and 
grenade launchers within the compound. The precariously distant American 
mortar fire pit (farthest point southwest) would also be resupplied from this point, 
illustrating that location priority may not be optimal for every need.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter identified several security concepts from studying how 
combat outposts are designed in both doctrine and real life. Clear lines of 
demarcation in the form of a perimeter provide protection to those within. The 
perimeter also provides the opportunity to monitor activity approaching the CO 
and to inspect the ingress and egress of personnel and vehicles. The structures 
within the CO are purposefully located to ensure a balance of protection and 
access. Chapter III discusses security concepts in the cyber domain. Chapter IV 
discusses the application of combat outpost security concepts to cybersecurity.  
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III. SURVEY OF CYBERSECURITY PROTECTION MODELS  
This chapter examines models developed to secure networks. An 
examination of network models varied by connectivity, isolation, purpose, and 
location will support identification of the core security concepts in use in 
cyberspace, and will provide the basis for comparison with the practice of 
perimeter defense in military operations. 
A. NETWORK PERIMETER DESIGN 
Network perimeter designs vary extremely, however many utilize a 
generalized topology for a secure network perimeter entails three networks in 
concert separated by two firewalls. The most external network is the Internet, 
which is separated from the perimeter network or demilitarized zone (DMZ) by a 
perimeter firewall and a series of switches and routers. The DMZ network is 
separated from an Internal Network by an internal firewall.  
A DMZ network serves to host information that may be exposed to traffic 
from the Internet. The term DMZ is borrowed from the Korean War term for the 
area of land that serves as a buffer zone between North and South Korea 
following the end of military action in the 1950s. A DMZ is a network that 
operates as a buffer zone between an organization’s internal network and the 
Internet. The DMZ should prevent unauthorized access to the internal network 
from the outside. Deployed in conjunction with strong firewall rules and policies, a 
DMZ is an integral part of a secure network design. The Internal Network hosts 
information that is only exposed to the Internet through the use of applications or 
servers in the DMZ. Direct access to the internal network from the Internet should 
not be possible without the use of proxy services in the DMZ [7].  
Figure 5 illustrates a simple view of a general network boundary or 
perimeter. Network boundaries can be thought of in a linear sense because the 
data travels over the wire. The internal network may be extremely expansive, but 
should only connect to the Internet through a boundary configured in this tiered 
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manner. There may be more than one set of internal firewalls allowing access to 
the DMZ, or there may be multiple DMZ networks. A serious security flaw would 
exist in a network that had direct access to the Internet from an internal machine; 
this is what is known as a backdoor in cyber security [8].  
 
Figure 5.  Simplified Network Boundary View, from [9] 
Firewalls control the bidirectional flow of traffic between networks. The 
Internet represents the “wild” and the source of external attacks. Network 
administrators configure firewalls to allow or disallow traffic based on Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses and protocol characteristics, ports and application-level 
protocol characteristics. Individual traffic types and ports can be configured with a 
range of rules ranging from “ALWAYS ALLOW” to “NEVER ALLOW” with 
configurations in between to allow for legitimate or trusted traffic flow.  
Within the DMZ, only non-sensitive data and services that are accessible 
once allowable traffic is passed through the firewall from the public network to the 
DMZ should be allowed. Public data such as general website information and 
services such as submission forms and information feeds are examples of data 
that would be properly hosted inside a DMZ. Sensitive information, such as 
business or mission databases containing user data or financial data should 
default to hosting inside the business network and only be hosted in a DMZ for 
specific cases, such as email servers. Sensitive data that is hosted in the DMZ 
should not be made accessible directly to the public network.  
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B. MONITORING 
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) and intrusion prevention systems (IPS) 
are typically utilized in the DMZ to monitor and control the flow of data into and 
out of a network. IDSs and IPSs are software-based systems deployed to 
commodity hardware or existing networking devices that support the process of 
monitoring events occurring on a network or computer system. These events are 
analyzed for signs of security incidents representing violations of security 
policies.  
IDS and IPS devices that investigate network traffic can be 
preprogrammed with signatures that indicate malicious activity and trigger rules 
that make decisions based on the characteristics of the scanned traffic. 
According to the Snort User manual:  
…rules are divided into two logical sections, the rule header and 
the rule options. The rule header contains the rule’s action, 
protocol, source and destination IP addresses and netmasks, and 
the source and destination ports information. The rule option 
section contains alert messages and information on which parts of 
the packet should be inspected to determine if the rule action 
should be taken. [10]  
By targeting inbound and outbound traffic between the Internet and 
internal networks, IDS and IPS sensors can identify attempted intrusions. Some 
malware is designed to communicate with command and control networks  
(e.g., botnets) and therefore create outbound traffic. If this outbound traffic is 
destined for a known bad IP address or domain, then a signature can be written 
to identify that activity.  
IDS and IPS sensors can also be utilized to monitor internal network traffic 
and programmed with rules that enforce acceptable use policies and alert 
security officials in the event of a violation. Internal traffic such as file transfers 
and database accesses are key areas of interest that can reveal insider threat 
activity. Each alert requires investigation, but is not necessarily a positive 
indicator of malicious activity [11].  
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a. Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems 
An IDS is designed to detect problems and raise alerts. These alerts can 
be sent to a secondary system that can then take action or aid in analysis. An 
IDS can be deployed in-line or out-of line with regards to the network traffic. An 
in-line IDS operates as a pass-through networking device where the traffic comes 
in and goes out of the IDS. The IDS then matches traffic against the pre-defined 
signatures. An in-line IDS supports detection of and response to threats in real 
time at network speed. Figure 6 illustrates the placement of a sensor inline in the 
DMZ architecture between the internal network and the Internet.  
 
Figure 6.  NIST Inline Network Sensor Example, from [11] 
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An out-of-line or passive IDS is provided network traffic from a mirror or 
passively monitors network segments in promiscuous mode. The IDS then 
performs its automated analysis via and populates an alert log. Multiple sensors 
may be placed at various points in the network path to support aggregation and 
correlation at a management console. Differences detected amongst various 
points in the network can indicate malicious activity and support faster 
identification of attempted or actual network compromise. Network load balancing 
devices may be necessary to prevent individual sensors from becoming 
overloaded with traffic at a time of intense activity. Figure 7 illustrates the 
placement of a passive sensor suite within the DMZ architecture between the 
internal network and the Internet. 
 
Figure 7.  NIST Passive Network Sensor Example, from [11] 
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IPSs are similar to IDSs, with one main distinction: an IPS can take direct 
action in response to potentially malicious traffic. As such an IPS is typically 
deployed in-line with network traffic so that it can prevent malicious traffic from 
getting to its destination. IDS and IPS devices provide the necessary functions of 
detection of and protection from adversarial network activity [12]. 
(1) In-line System Implementation Considerations. In-line systems 
require consideration of specific factors for placement on the network. An IPS 
should be placed at the network edge devices within the DMZ to capture data as 
soon as it enters the DMZ from either the Internet or Internal network. Brief 
network outages may be necessary when installing an inline device because the 
end to end connections have to be disrupted to insert the device. There should 
be no IP addresses assigned to the monitoring interfaces of the sensor device to 
prevent detection by adversaries during reconnaissance activities [11]. 
(2) Passive System Implementation Considerations. Not surprisingly, 
passive systems require consideration of different factors than in-line systems. 
Passive systems may require load balancing components designed to distribute 
the traffic amongst several IDS sensors. The traffic from these separate sensors 
then needs to be combined again at the management console in the correct 
network sequence to support post-event analysis. The addition of load balancers, 
switch spanning ports, and network taps requires careful attention at installation. 
Network taps may be installed with minimal network outage if the interfaces are 
carefully managed by the network administrators. Passive sensors should also 
be configured without IP addresses at the interfaces to prevent identification by 
adversaries [11]. 
b. Security Incident and Event Management 
In addition to the possibility of real-time monitoring, all network systems 
should be providing activity log data to a central location. A security incident and 
event management (SIEM) system often provides a key capability for logging 
systems in a network security operations center. High powered correlation  
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engines designed with business intelligence for security applications can learn 
the normal traffic behavior on a network and begin to identify anomalies that 
require further investigation.  
SIEM devices offer an indirect method of integrating multiple IDS and IPS 
devices and capabilities with other network system logs. SIEM devices are 
designed to support a broad array of data types including firewall logs, antivirus 
software data, operating system audit logs and application server logs [11]. Each 
of these data types goes through a normalization process to align and 
standardize the data types to support correlation of same-type data fields. IP 
addresses, domain names, time stamps, and other identifying data can be used 
by the systems or security personnel to develop patterns of normal and abnormal 
activity. Abnormal activity can then be further investigated by security analysts to 
determine if it is malicious.  
SIEM devices offer complementary services to IDS and IPS capabilities 
through their integration of data types. Not only do SIEMs offer a back-end 
platform to normalize and integrate the data, but they also offer front-end 
consoles or dashboards to provide a view of the integrated data for network and 
security operations staff analysis and response. This single view and access to 
data is intended to make it easier for security personnel to link IDS alert data to 
supporting information from log files [11]. 
Despite the advantages, there are areas where a SIEM device might not 
perform as well an IDS or IPS solution. Processing lag resulting from the 
methods by which a SIEM receives its data, for instance, prevents real-time 
action and alerting [10]. Data from logs are generally loaded into a SIEM in 
batches on a recurring schedule while alerts from IDS and IPS machines can 
stream in real time. This means that SIEM correlation of new log and alert data 
cannot occur until completion of a batch cycle. SIEMs may also have limitations 
in what data they can ingest from external devices, such as packet capture data 
that may not be available because of the significant storage requirements. 
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C. DATA STORAGE AND SEPARATION 
Balancing access to various types of data and security of that data is a 
challenge for all network and security professionals. In order to be of use data 
must be accessible to the services, applications, and users that need it. That 
same data is also sought after by adversaries and threat actors, so it must be 
protected through a series of controls designed to achieve that balance. Two 
types of data are user data and mission data. 
1. User Data 
User data can be separated into to two separate categories. The first is 
user account information that represents the roles and responsibilities of network 
users. User account information contains data describing the rights of individual 
users to access the network and its applications, services and data. User 
account information must be secured from adversary actions, but must be made 
accessible in real time to the network services that consume the information as 
part of identity control and access management. The second category is data 
that specifically identifies the human being represented by the data. Personally 
Identifiable Information (PII) for most uses is limited to the account establishment 
process, but certain missions require the continued use of PII to support 
operations. 
a. User Account Data 
User account data is a centrally managed set of data that supports 
positive identification and enforcement of access control for an end user. Both 
Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) use 
a two-factor authentication process to allow end users access to the core 
business networks. DOD requires users to use their government-issued common 
access card (CAC) and a PIN number to access computers connected to the 
Unclassified Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET). DHS 
requires users to use their government-issued personal identity verification (PIV) 
card and a PIN number to access computers connected to the Unclassified Local 
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Access Network (known as LAN-A). Both DOD and DHS operate in this manner 
consistent with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12—Policy for Common 
Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors [13]. 
The combined use of the hard token (e.g., CAC or PIV card) and the PIN 
number is known as two-factor authentication. The card contains certificate 
information that allows the client computer system to call back to a central server 
(or virtualized and distributed set of services) that can verify that the card and 
PIN are matched to an authorized user account on the network. Each user 
session is discrete, in that users must re-authenticate themselves to start a new 
session or after a period of inactivity. The roles and access credentials stored in 
the central server follow the end user for their entire session and allow access to 
appropriate types of data, applications and services. The Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 12 requirement to comply with a two-factor authentication 
scheme, one of which must be a hard token, is an increased security measure 
over the simple username and password paradigms that persist in many 
networked systems and applications today [13]. 
Hard tokens are not yet fully implemented across the government for 
networks, applications or systems; and username and password systems are still 
in wide use. Systems with this level of user account information are especially 
inviting to threat actors, because the reduced security measures make it easier 
for adversaries to represent themselves to the network as authorized users to 
gain access. As such usernames and passwords should never be stored or 
transmitted together in plain text. One-way encryption or hash algorithms are 
typically used to protect username and password combinations, and password 
strength requirements are used to increase the password entropy to mitigate the 
threat of brute force cracking or guessing attacks. Access to the areas of the 
network where the user account information is stored should be heavily protected 
and extremely limited in access [14]. 
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b. Personally Identifiable Information 
PII is a class of data that can be used to specifically identify an individual. 
PII is frequently collected and stored as part of the human resource process and 
is used by the network as supporting information in account creation. There are 
also certain mission areas that require the collection and use of PII. These 
missions require the establishment of a system of record through a system of 
record notice (SORN) to comply with the Privacy Act of 1974, when any Federal 
agency creates a system that maintains records about an individual and those 
records are retrieved, indexed, or searchable by PII data. Examples of PII data 
include [15]: 
 Names; full, maiden, mother’s maiden, or alias 
 Identification numbers; social security number, passport number, 
driver’s license number, financial account or credit card numbers; 
numbers of personally owned property such as vehicle registration 
or title numbers. 
 Address information; street or physical addresses and email 
 Asset information; IP address or media access control (MAC) 
address that are statically assigned as a consistent link back to a 
person 
 Telephone numbers; mobile and land, personal and business 
 Personal characteristics: physical feature descriptions, photographs 
or images  
 Information linked to the above; including date of birth, place of 
birth, race, religion. 
2. Mission Data 
Mission data (also referred to as business or operational data) represent 
the core data responsibility for protection and use and is integral to the 
responsibilities or value of the organization. This data is typically hosted on the 
internal network and is accessible through internal network applications or proxy 
services in the DMZ. Proxy services in the DMZ are responsible for ensuring that 
inbound requests are authorized and that query responses are compliant with the 
security polices of the network and organization. Figure 8 illustrates how a client 
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machine first authenticates its user through account data, then supports access 
to mission data.  
 
Figure 8.  Simplified Access Request Process Illustration 
D. ACADEMIC VIEW 
All discussion in the chapter about network security principles has been 
based on or cited to federal or military publications governing the proper setup of 
secure networks. To ensure that the similarity of the respective military and law 
enforcement missions of the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security 
were not self-serving to this paper’s intent to compare and contrast physical and 
cyber domains, additional research of non-federal entities was conducted to 
devise a list of requirements for network security. The network management and 
security requirements for the University of Massachusetts at Boston (UMB) were 
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reviewed and chosen to serve as the representative source of non-military/law 
enforcement (LE) requirements. These network policies for the university were 
chosen because they were openly published in full detail and with traceability to 
the various laws created to protect actions on the Internet. The laws that are 
supported by the UMB network policies include, but are not limited to, the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the 
United States Patriot Act and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. The 
requirements for the network perimeter are as synthesized1 as follows [16]:  
 All inbound and real-time external connections are required to pass 
through an additional access control point (e.g., firewall). The 
access control point will uniquely identify each user, device, and 
port in use. 
 All network traffic will be monitored as necessary to detect 
unauthorized activity or intrusion attempts and to ensure proper 
network management and performance.  
 Security audits and scans of any computer, server, or network 
device may be conducted at any time to support network 
operations. If vulnerabilities that could jeopardize the larger network 
are identified, then corrective action will be taken, to include 
denying the subject machine access to the network until the 
problem is addressed. 
 All network filtering devices must be approved by the network 
security group to ensure proper operation of the network.  
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviewed the basic security concepts for network design. 
Purposeful creation of network perimeters through use of firewalls and DMZs 
separate sensitive networks from the World Wide Web. The National Institute for 
Standards and Technology (NIST) provides specific guidance on the 
implementation of monitoring technologies through intrusion detection and 
prevention platforms. The security design of the network must balance 
authorized use and access of necessary data against the protection from 
                                            
1 Not all requirements published by UMB are presented in this list, just the ones for the 
network security. The requirements listed were distilled to their core functions. The full list can be 
seen on the UMB website at www.umb.edu/it/policies/server.  
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unauthorized attempts to access that data. Security in network design is not just 
a concern for the federal government or military as seen in the network policies 
of the IT department at UMB. Chapter IV will discuss how the application of 
combat outpost security concepts to a CO discussed in Chapter II apply to the 
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IV. INVESTIGATION AND COMPARISON OF PHYSICAL 
VERSUS CYBER  
The previous chapters examined typical implementations for FOB and CO 
security and protected network security. This chapter will conduct a comparative 
analysis of both to identify conceptual similarities that might facilitate the 
transition of personnel from physical security roles in the military into the 
cybersecurity workforce. 
A. MAPPING BETWEEN WORLDS 
While a simple drawing like Figure 9 may serve to illustrate the idea that 
there is traceability between a physical location and a computer network in terms 




Figure 9.  FOB and CO and Network Illustration 
The mapping of military operations to cybersecurity concepts starts small 
with easily identifiable analogs. This primitive lexicon will serve as a foundation 
upon which advanced techniques and applications can be built in order to foster 
longevity and minimize miscommunication. Table 2 provides a cursory 
traceability of analog concepts between the physical security of FOBs and COs 




Concept Physical Cyber 
Demarcation of Defended Area Perimeter structure Network boundary 
Ingress/Egress Inspection Point Entry control points Firewalls/DMZ 
Monitoring (Unmanned) Ground sensors, LRAS,  IDS/IPS/SIEM 
Monitoring (Manned) TOC, patrols SOC/NOC, CERT 
Places Buildings/structures Data storage 
People Living quarters/work quarters Personnel/account data/PII 
Things Fuel/ammo supply areas Mission data 
Table 2.   Cyber and Physical Security Concept Alignment 
1. Similarities 
Identifying the similarities between the physical and cyber worlds will 
serve to draw interest from warriors with combat experience looking for their next 
career highlighting facets of cyber security to which they can apply their skillsets.  
a. Demarcation of Defended Area and Ingress/Egress Inspection 
Point 
In a FOB or CO the perimeter is the lifeline for all soldiers to guard. It is 
watched vigilantly and protected ferociously. Nothing is supposed to enter or exit 
that perimeter without permission and protection. In a network the perimeter is 
the network boundary, used to demark ownership and responsibility. Security 
accreditation takes place within that boundary, and very tight controls are placed 
on the ingress and egress routes to and from the network enclave inside the 
boundary. 
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b. Monitoring (Unmanned) 
For both physical facilities such as FOBs and COs and networked cyber 
systems, unmanned monitoring capabilities are comprised of sensors tied into 
systems that can interpret their data and make decisions based on rule sets. 
Unmanned capabilities can operate in a passive mode, where all data is 
collected and analyzed for presentation to a human for decision making, or they 
can operate in an active mode where responsive action is taken without human 
intervention. Physical systems such as the Combat Outpost and Force Protection 
System, also known as KRAKEN, have the ability to detect incoming enemy fire 
and return fire [17] just like the SAIC Cloudshield 4000 Deep Packet Processor 
can block, redirect, or modify malicious network traffic at line speed [18]. 
c. Monitoring (Manned) 
Soldiers monitoring fusion cell displays and common operational pictures 
(COP) in a TOC perform the same role as network analysts monitoring a SIEM 
device in a NOC or SOC. In both areas sensors can produce large volumes of 
data that require automation to identify anomalies to present to humans for 
further investigation, however both areas also require skilled personnel trained in 
decision making, leadership, and technical expertise related to the systems and 
tools at their disposal.  
d. Places 
The careful and specific design of physical structures in a FOB or CO is a 
constantly evolving area of engineering. Physical structures must balance the 
logistical requirements necessary to build and maintain them with the mission 
requirements for adequate protection, capacity, and communications. Data 
storage requires the same exacting approach to design, engineering and 
execution. Capacity and access requirements must be well defined in support of 
the mission to enable proper and timely buildout of back-end data storage 
solutions.  
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e. People  
The individuals stationed at a FOB or CO are there to accomplish a 
mission. They must be accounted for, provided protection, and assured that 
proper adherence to the rules will greatly increase their safety. User accounts for 
a network must be treated similarly. They represent the unique identity of a 
specific user. That identity is assigned specific roles and responsibilities on a 
network. The user accounts contain substantial PII and other sensitive 
information about the role that individual plays in the network. If user account 
information is compromised, then trust in the network erodes.  
f. Things  
Two important things for soldiers to locate and protect within a FOB or CO 
are the ammunition for the weapons and fuel for the vehicles and power 
generators. They both must be stored at minimum safe distances from where 
soldiers sleep, or where vehicles are parked in the event of an unintended 
detonation. Ammunition must also be easily accessed by soldiers in a fight. In a 
network, the business or mission data plays a similar role. It must be secured 
and protected from unwarranted access whilst being made readily available to 
proper access. Proper access to data must be met with timely and accurate 
delivery of the data without corruption or failure.  
2. Differences 
The differences in implementation of similar security concepts relates 
primarily to the manual nature of FOB and CO operations when compared with 
the potential for automation in a network environment. These implementation 
differences align with skillset gaps that will form the foundation for training in 
support of transitioning combat veterans into the cyber workforce.  
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a. Demarcation of Defended Area and Ingress/Egress Inspection 
Point 
In the physical world the line of demarcation logically and physically 
encompasses the defended area. In the network sense, the definition is only 
logical. Networks are built around nodes (e.g., computers, switches, routers, 
etc.). Those nodes comprise the area, but there is not necessarily any physical 
space between them. Subsequently, the perimeter in a network sense is defined 
not by the physical location of the nodes, but by the paths by which external 
nodes can connect from outside the logical boundary. Individual nodes that 
cannot connect outside the boundary cannot even see the boundary.  
Gates are used in a FOB or CO to specifically control the ingress and 
egress of individuals, vehicles, and equipment through the perimeter. It is very 
important for control to be established at these gates to allow for proper 
inspection, identification, verification and authorization for everyone and 
everything coming into the FOB or CO. Gates allow for throughput to be throttled 
or even stopped for a period of time in the event of a threat. Gates are a manual 
process for humans to administer thoroughly at a FOB or CO. In a network 
however, the security concepts for gates must be heavily automated. Firewalls 
and other boundary gateway devices are programmed with rules that control how 
internal and external nodes are allowed to communicate with nodes on the 
network. Access control lists (ACL), for instance, can be created to allow specific 
systems or applications to communicate across networks while limiting those 
communications to those that are required to conduct authorized transactions.  
b. Monitoring (Unmanned) 
Operationally and functionally, the unmanned capabilities in a FOB or CO 
and in the cyber domain are similar. An analysis and summary presentation of 




Section IV-B-1. The most significant difference lies in the training required to 
operate and maintain the very specific technologies employed in unmanned 
monitoring modes.  
c. Monitoring (Manned) 
Within a physical installation, guards are placed on the perimeter in sentry 
roles at the gates and observation posts along the boundary. Guards are put on 
frequent patrol both inside and outside the perimeter. They operate the gates and 
when required, the guns, in their role as protectors of the FOB or CO. Everyone 
in the FOB or CO is responsible for security, but those on guard at any specific 
time are required to be the most vigilant. NOC and SOC and Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team (CERT) operators provide similar functions but use 
very different methods. NOC and SOC operators have their eyes on the 
perimeter and the network assets. They are responsible for updating the ACLs 
inside the firewalls, updating the anti-virus (AV) signatures in use on host 
machines, and pouring through volumes of audit log data in search of anomalies 
that might indicate malicious activity. NOC and SOC operators rely on 
sophisticated SIEMs that automate much of the audit process. When malicious 
activity is identified, CERT operators are deployed to handle on-site response 
activities as a service to the compromised organization.  
d. Places 
Constructing physical structures can require large engineering teams and 
mechanical equipment. As an example of the amount of time required to 
construct a CO, recent requirements statements for future CO technologies have 
required that a CO be constructed in 30 days or less. COs are built in hostile 
environments as a means to support counterinsurgency or other operations. Data 
storage solutions, on the other hand, are part of a very mature commercial 
market space, with turn-key solutions available from a number of vendors. 
Supported by virtualization and cloud storage services, data management teams 
can rapidly deploy data storage systems that meet the defined mission 
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requirements. On-site engineers may be required to install the hardware required 
to host the data storage solutions, but most configurations and setup work 
following the hardware installation can be accomplished remotely from the 
network operations center.  
e. People 
Individuals, specifically service members, located in a FOB or CO are all 
individually responsible for security operations. Platoons may operate in shifts 
with primary security responsibility shifting between groups during daily 
operations, however, if enemy contact occurs and all soldiers are ordered to 
“stand to,” everyone is again responsible for security. In the cyber world, where 
the similarity relates to the individual’s data, the responsibility to protect that data 
can be situationally dependent. Individuals are still primarily responsible for 
inputting their personal data into information systems, and individuals are 
responsible for security concepts such as password management and authorized 
use. Unlike the physical model, however, general users eventually have no role 
to play with the security of their data while at rest within an IT system. If an IT 
system is compromised and user data is corrupted or stolen, there is nothing a 
user can then do to re-secure the system. Individuals must then fall back on 
personal mitigation strategies such as identify theft protection and credit 
monitoring to ensure that their stolen data is not being used in criminal activity.  
f. Things  
Guns and ordnance, from small arms to heavy weapons, provide offensive 
capabilities to soldiers in a FOB or CO. These capabilities are necessary to repel 
an attack and defeat the enemy at close range and at distance as required. Small 
arms are assigned to each individual soldier, and most soldiers are responsible 
for multiple small arms while on duty. These small arms can be of multiple types, 
including standard battle rifles, machine guns, precision marksman rifles and 
many others. AV signatures are similar to small arms in that they are assigned at 
the lowest level of individual, but humans are not the targets or protected entities 
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in a cyber fight. Individual computing systems such as desktop end clients, 
network and application servers, and all networking gear must be individually 
hardened to mitigate cyber threats. The IDS and IPS sensors monitor and act on 
network traffic, but defense in depth protection starts at the lowest level machine. 
Host machines are loaded with anti-virus capabilities that use signatures to 
identify and remove malicious code from their systems. These signatures can 
vary in capability from simple filename matching, to cryptographic hashing 
algorithms to complex combinations of several indicators at a time.  
B. IDENTIFYING TRAINING GAPS 
Section IV-A combines the security concepts of the physical and cyber 
worlds to show how their similarities may support a transition for veterans. The 
differences identified in the previous section make it clear that the preponderance 
of the training required to support the transition of military personnel with physical 
security roles to cybersecurity positions lies in the technologies and 
implementation of the security concepts rather than the concepts themselves. 
Further specificity of the training gaps can bring practical fidelity to the analysis. 
The following sections analyze the requirements for systems designed to support 
physical and cybersecurity missions, specifically in the unmanned monitoring 
concepts and the requirements for cyber network defenders as shown in federal 
agency job announcements.  
1. Operational Requirements 
DHS and DOD have formal processes for the acquisition of new 
technologies. These processes are quite similar to each other and follow best 
practices of systems engineering lifecycles. Governing documents exist in both 
Departments to codify the processes. For DHS implementation of these 
processes is governed by the Acquisition Management Directive MD-102 [19] 
and its appendices and DOD implementation is governed by DOD Directive 
5000.01, The Defense Acquisition System and DOD Instruction 5000.2, 
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System [20]. Both processes require 
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approval of a formal requirements document prior to committing funds to procure 
or build a new capability. Further, requirements documents are required to lay 
out the operational requirements of the mission that will be supported by the new 
capabilities. In DHS this document is the Operational Requirements Document 
(ORD) [19] . Capabilities Description Documents (CDD) are the DOD equivalent 
to the DHS ORD [19], [20]. 
Analysis of various ORDs and CDDs for both physical and cyber intrusion 
detection and prevention systems in DOD and DHS has led to this generalized 
list of measures of effectiveness (MOE) by which these systems can be 
assessed: [21] 
1. Intrusion detection rate: The capability to detect a given percentage 
of attempted intrusions into a defined protected area 
2. Error rate: The mathematical inverse of intrusion detection rate 
3. Sensor communication: The sensors will communicate data in real 
time.  
4. Sensor coverage: Sensors will have the capacity to sense 
intrusions in a specific maximum size area (physical systems) or 
across a specific maximum number of network nodes (cyber 
systems) 
5. Adaptable coverage: User changes to sensor settings can be made 
with instant application of effect and maintain effectiveness within 
any range less than maximum.  
6. Threat characterization: Sensors have the ability to distinguish 
threat types at intrusion.  
7. False alarm rate: The rate at which friendly/allowed intrusions are 
characterized incorrectly as threat activity; Written as less than or 
equal to or not to exceed given percentages. False alarm may be a 
subset of Error rate.  
8. Layered detection: Sensors must be able to distinguish between 
signs of a possible or impending intrusion versus occurrence of an 
actual intrusion.  
Of these MOEs, intrusion detection and error rate highlight the need for 




of the sensor data is hindered if the high success rates are not met. NOC, SOC 
and CERT operators will need to be able to interpret and trust the sensor data as 
they execute their mission.  
Requirements three through five highlight the need for intrusion detection 
and prevention systems to operate in real time and adapt to the dynamic nature 
of the monitored environment. As the nature of threats change to increase their 
chance of success, the security apparatus must also be ready to adapt. This 
implies that the apparatus must be able to detect threats in real time up to the 
maximum range or bandwidth of the protected system. Additionally, sensors 
must also communicate with the fusion center in real-time. In a cyber defense 
model, the fusion center is operated by NOC or SOC personnel who continually 
tune the sensors to maximize detection rates and ranges and continually adapt to 
the threat. In environments where smart sensors are able to tune themselves, the 
NOC and SOC operators must be able to interpret changes in the data stream 
that result from the sensor changes.  
Requirements six through eight address the necessary skill sets of cyber 
professionals providing security, utilizing systems that meet all other 
requirements. Cyber warriors need to be able to distinguish good activity from 
bad activity, between different types of bad activity, and adjust to the subtle signs 
of changing activity in network operations. This need is anchored by fundamental 
skillsets in networking concepts such as channels, ports and protocols and their 
implementation and use in authorized and unauthorized network activity.  
2. Outline Cyber Job Requirements 
There is no single or dedicated federal General Series occupational 
category for cybersecurity professionals, but cybersecurity positions fall into a 
pool of different job specialties. The most prevalent job series is the information 
technology (IT) specialist, GS 2210. Another job series is the computer scientist, 
GS 1550 job series. The main difference between the job series is the positive  
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education requirement in the GS 1550 qualifications which requires a college 
degree in computer science or computer engineering. IT specialists, on the other 
hand, have no positive education requirement [22].  
Data was collected from job listings on the USAJobs website in the time 
period of February 15 through April 15, 2014. The job listings were of new federal 
job announcements in the 2210 and 1550 job series at the grade level of GS 9-
11 (entry level) with key words “cyber” and “cybersecurity.” Results included 76 
separate job announcements for vacancies across all three branches of 
government, multiple cabinet-level agencies in the Executive Branch, all four 
branches of military service, and multiple sub-agencies [23]. Unfortunately for 
this research, there was very little insight to be gained from the boilerplate 
language approved by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to advertise 
the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to perform these jobs. Research 
turned to the National Security Agency’s job announcements for cybersecurity 
jobs and found sufficient information to create a list of detailed requirements and 
technical competencies detailed in the remainder of this chapter [24], [25].  
a. Position Requirements 
Position requirements identify the necessary skills or tasks necessary to 
successfully perform the duties of the job. Position descriptions are an important 
method of communicating the needs of an organization in terms of human capital 
and helps job seekers to understand how their skillsets may apply to the job. The 
following list was assembled from reviewing multiple job announcements 
describing entry level cybersecurity positions in the federal government:  
 Understanding of networking concepts, protocols, and 
implementations (e.g., TCP/IP, routing, DNS) 
 Understanding of operating system concepts in both Windows and 
Solaris/Linux (e.g., processes and threads, file systems, memory) 
and proficiency in systems administration and command line tools. 
 Hands-on experience managing, maintaining, troubleshooting, 
installing, and operating common operating systems and basic 
network infrastructure 
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 Understanding of and ability to describe current network 
technologies (e.g., routers, switches, firewalls) 
 Experience with structured programming and scripting 
 Understanding of common security solutions and their 
implementations (e.g., firewalls, intrusion detection systems, virus 
detection tools). 
b. Technical Competencies 
Technical competencies are detailed skills identified for specific jobs that 
describe the types of tools or technologies that applicants must be familiar with or 
fluent in to be considered for the advertised position. Technical competencies 
add a deeper level of detail to a job description and are aligned with the position 
requirements. The following list was assembled from reviewing multiple job 
announcements describing entry-level cybersecurity positions in the federal 
government:  
 Operating system and network analysis 
 Operating system administration (e.g., Windows and Unix or Linux) 
 Intrusion detection and response 
 Penetration testing 
 Packet analysis 
 Computer and network forensics 
 Low level protocol analysis 
 Network administration 
 Vulnerability analysis 
 Malicious code analysis 
 Network applications 
 Strong writing and verbal skills 
 Networking protocols 
 Log and packet-level tool experience 
 Network attack techniques  
 Operating system platforms (e.g., UNIX, Linux, Microsoft Windows) 
 Network intrusion analysis and incident response 
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C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter combines the analysis from Chapters II and III and creates a 
linkage between the physical and cyber worlds to support transition for veterans 
in combat roles to service in cyber roles. That linkage is carried further with the 
review of the state of federal job positions in cybersecurity and identification of 
the applicable cyber job skills. Table 3 provides a consolidated view of the 
traceability from security concepts through the topics of this chapter and sets the 
conditions for Chapter V to explore the programs available to support veterans 
interested in further service through federal employment and available training 
programs that can provide the technical competencies required for federal 
cybersecurity positions.  
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Perimeter Structure Network Boundary Understanding of networking 
concepts, protocols, and 





Entry Control Points Firewalls/DMZ Understanding of and ability to 
describe current network 
technologies (e.g., routers, 
switches, firewalls) 
Understanding of common 
security solutions and their 
implementations (e.g. firewalls, 






IDS/IPS/SIEM Vulnerability Analysis 
Intrusion detection and response 
Monitoring 
(Manned) 
TOC, Patrols SOC/NOC, CERT Operating system and network 
analysis 
Operating system administration 
(Windows and Unix/Linux) 
Intrusion detection and response 
Penetration testing 
Packet analysis 
Computer and network forensics 
Low level protocol analysis 
Network administration 
Vulnerability analysis 
Malicious code analysis 
Places Buildings/Structures Data storage Hands-on experience managing, 
maintaining, troubleshooting, 
installing, and operating common 
operating systems and basic 





Things Fuel/Ammo Supply 
Areas 
Mission Data 
Table 3.   Traceability to Job Skills 
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V. IDENTIFICATION OF AVAILABLE TRAINING IN SUPPORT 
OF TRANSITION  
This chapter provides a survey of available commercial training in the 
areas of network, computer, and cybersecurity from a variety of commercial and 
educational institutions that will allow for traceability to a series of classes 
customized to fill gaps outlined in Chapter IV. 
A. PRIVATE INDUSTRY CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS 
This section reviews several certifications offered by private organizations 
that are applicable to careers in cybersecurity. Each of these certifications is 
supported by training options that include classroom instruction or self-paced 
online instruction. The majority of the certifications are associated with the 
Computing Technology Industry Association (CompTIA). Other organizations 
such as the Global Information Assurance Certifications (GIAC) organization, the 
International Council of Electronic Commerce Consultants and the Information 
Systems Security Certification Consortium also offer well respected certification 
programs [26].  
1. Computing Technology Industry Association (CompTIA) 
a. A+ 
The A+ certification is designed for entry level computer technicians. 
There are two exams that must be passed to earn the A+ certification. The 
exams cover the basic principles of computer technology. The first exams covers 
the essentials of installing and configuring personal computers and related 
peripheral hardware as well as basic networking. The second exam covers 
knowledge gained through practical application of the computer skill sets tested 
in the first exam. Practical application knowledge includes installation and 
configuration of various operating systems and establishment of network 
connectivity to support file sharing, web browsing, and email capabilities. Mobile 
platform operating systems are also covered by the latest version of the A+ 
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certification exams. The A+ certification is valid for three years from date of 
issuance, and a continuing education program has been established for A+ 
certified professionals to maintain their currency and certification.  
b. Network+ 
Network+ is a certification awarded to IT professionals that have 
demonstrated competency through a formal exam in the area of networking. 
Network technicians must demonstrate that they understand network 
technologies and how to install and configure networking hardware. Exam topics 
include the Open Systems Interconnection reference model and the ports and 
protocols required to securely establish connections between computers and 
servers and peripheral devices. These skills are necessary for Local Area 
Network administration and management of connections to Wide Area Networks. 
The certification objectives continue to evolve to meet technologies advances. 
Recent updates to the exam include networking virtualization and security.  
c. Server+ 
Server+ is the CompTIA certification specifically designed to qualify IT 
professionals for working on servers. Servers require specific knowledge on 
hardware and operating systems that perform very differently than the client 
machines covered in the A+ certification. The Server+ exam covers skills and 
knowledge in storage technologies such as redundant array of independent disks 
and multiple computer processing units required to administer the large 
machines that operate as servers. The exam also covers practical application 
knowledge such as disaster recovery and continuity of operations planning and 
design for servers. CompTIA recommends that IT professionals complete A+ 
certification prior to seeking Server+ certification.   
d. Linux+ 
Linux+ is the CompTIA certification that measures the skills and 
knowledge necessary to excel as an entry level Linux administrator. There are 
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two exams that support the certification, which has been bolstered by association 
with the Linux Professional Institute. The first exam is focused on certifying IT 
professional as having the necessary skills to install Linux systems and set up 
the Linux file system using the command line interface. The second exam covers 
detailed operation of Linux systems such as setting up system services and 
using shells and scripting for data management. User interfaces, systems 
security and networking of Linux systems are also covered by the second exam. 
The Linux+ certification focuses on the use of the Linux operating systems as a 
server operating system vice a client desktop operating system. This focuses the 
certification into areas such as package management for various Linux 
distributions and mounting file systems such as Network File Systems and 
Server Message Block/Common Internet File Systems.  
e. Security+ 
The CompTIA Security+ certification is issued after successfully 
completing one exam. The exam is designed to validate that IT professionals 
have the knowledge and skills to manage risk in securing a computer network. 
The exam covers topics such as access control and identity management. 
Cryptography is also an important topic covered by the exam to ensure the 
encryption and decryption of sensitive information is appropriately handled for 
data at rest and in transit. The certification exam continues to evolve to handle 
security concerns brought on by emerging technology areas such as cloud 
computing and business practices such as “bring your own device” policies that 
enable personal computing devices to be securely used with the business 
network. Certified IT professionals obtaining the Security+ certification will have 
demonstrated an understanding of risk identification and mitigation for network 
based security attack and how to employ deterrent tactics as they counter 
network attacks and close vulnerabilities.  
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2. Other Organizations  
a. GIAC Certified Intrusion Analyst (GCIA) 
The GIAC organization created the Certified Intrusion Analyst certification 
to validate an analyst’s ability to install and configure IDSs and monitor network 
traffic with those systems. Analysts must also demonstrate that they can interpret 
and analyze network traffic and log files presented by the IDS. Candidates that 
have passed the exam and earned the GIAC certification have demonstrated 
abilities in 17 separate objectives of intrusion detection [27].  
b. EC-Council Network Security Administrator (ENSA) 
The International Council of Electronic Commerce Consultants, or EC-
Council, developed a certification specifically for Network Security 
Administrators. The focus of this certification is to view network security as a 
defensive operation. The certification promotes fundamental skills in analysis of 
external and internal network threats. Candidates for this certification must 
demonstrate the ability to develop security policies that protect vital business or 
mission data. Those policies are implemented through configuration of firewalls 
and anti-virus systems. Technical security skills are required for implementation 
of security policies, but are not the only focus of this certification. Operational 
Security, information security, and the interdependency between those two 
domains are a core component of the certification. This ensures that candidate IT 
professionals understand security and can apply it to their networked computer 
systems [28]. 
c. Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) 
The Information Systems Security Certification Consortium created the 
CISSP certification as the baseline certification for information security. The 
CISSP certification exam tests a candidate’s knowledge in 10 different domains:
 Access control 
 Telecommunications and network security 
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 Information security governance and risk management 
 Software development security 
 Cryptography 
 Security architecture and design 
 Operations security 
 Business continuity and disaster recovery planning 
 Legal, regulations, investigations and compliance 
 Physical (environmental) security 
These 10 domains ensure that candidates understand the details of 
security architectures designed to protect the information and systems within the 
network boundary. Details of an institution’s information assets and the formation 
of policies and procedures are tested with respect to how IT network structures 
and data transmission and transportation formats are implemented to provide for 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Risk management skills are measured to 
ensure proper software and hardware system development is done with security 
built in to the foundation of the architecture. Business interests such as continuity 
of operations and disaster recovery are assessed along with the legal and 
regulatory aspects of the information security industry. The CISSP was 
recognized in 2013 as a top certification in IT by TechRepublic and IT Strategy 
News. The training required to achieve this certification provides for a solid 
foundation to an IT security career [29]. 
B. NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION PROGRAMS 
The Federal Information Technology Security Institute (FITSI) is a non-
profit organization founded to provide role-based training and certification 
programs to federal IT workers. FITSI administers a cyber training program 
focused on a class of veterans known as wounded warriors. Wounded warriors 
are veterans who have experienced serious injuries resulting in an end to their 
military career. The FITSI Wounded Warrior program specifically defines the 
characteristics that make veterans ideal candidates for retraining as 
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cybersecurity professionals. Two of the six characteristics identified by FITSI are 
the ability to be trained and the aptitude for tactics and strategy [30].  
The FITSI Wounded Warrior program provides training in a variety of 
cybersecurity disciplines using many of the available commercial training 
programs identified in Section C. Figure 10 illustrates how the FITSI program 
builds cybersecurity professionals from the ground up. The program is designed 
to provide a common base of instruction up to a generalist level, and then 




Figure 10.  Progressive Training Program, from [30] 
C. FEDERAL EFFORTS IN CYBERSECURITY EDUCATION 
1. Homeland Security Advisory Council Report 
A 2012 Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) report from the 
Cyberskills TaskForce provided eleven recommendations grouped under five 
Objectives to the Secretary for Homeland Security as follows: 1) ensure that the 
people given the responsibility for mission-critical cybersecurity roles and tasks at 
DHS have demonstrated that they have high proficiency in those areas; 2) help 
DHS employees develop and maintain advances in technical cybersecurity skills 
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and render their working environment so supportive that qualified candidates will 
prefer to work at DHS; 3) radically expand the pipeline of highly qualified 
candidates for technical mission-critical jobs through innovative partnerships with 
community colleges, universities, organizers of cyber competitions, and other 
federal agencies; 4) focus the majority of DHS’s near term efforts in cybersecurity 
hiring, training, and human capital development on ensuring that the Department 
builds a team of approximately 600 federal employees with mission-critical 
cybersecurity skills; and 5) establish a “Cyber Reserve” program to ensure the 
availability of a cadre of technically proficient cybersecurity professionals to be 
called upon if and when the nation needs them [31]. 
The third objective contains three of the eleven recommendations in the 
report. In the group of recommendations under Objective #3 is Recommendation 
#8, which calls for the Department to launch a major, sustained initiative to 
enhance the opportunities for U.S. veterans to be trained and hired in mission-
critical cybersecurity jobs.  
Recommendation #8 has eight implementation steps discussed in the 
report including outreach and communication programs, and partnerships 
between DHS and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to increase 
awareness of the need for cybersecurity professionals. The partnership includes 
mirroring website content on DHS and VA web space. This is an important 
communication tool to veterans seeking information about cybersecurity jobs in 
the federal government.  
2. National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education 
National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) is a national 
initiative led by NIST and supported by DHS, DoED, NSF, DOD and ODNI. NICE 
is comprised of four Components: awareness, education, workforce structure, 
and training and professional development. One major output from the NICE 
initiative is the National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework. The goal of the 
framework is to describe the work and workers required to establish a 
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cybersecurity workforce that is agnostic of organizational ties. The Framework is 
designed to support public, private and academic cybersecurity workforce needs. 
The Framework is organized into seven categories with 31 specialty areas. The 
seven categories of the workforce framework are [32]:  
1. Securely Provision—responsible for building the secure information 
systems 
2. Operate & Maintain—responsible for support and administration of 
the secure information systems 
3. Protect & Defend—responsible for analysis and mitigation of 
threats to IT systems and networks 
4. Investigate—responsible for investigation cyber event of crimes 
5. Collect & Operate—responsible for specialized operations and 
collection of information 
6. Analyze—responsible for specialized analysis of cyber information 
to determine potential for use as intelligence 
7. Oversight & Development—responsible for leadership, direction, or 
guidance to improve efficiency of cyber workforce 
D. FEDERAL VETERAN HIRING PROGRAMS AND INFORMATION 
WEBSITES 
There are several websites in the .gov and .mil domains that discuss post-
service employment options for veterans. They contain all the information or links 
to the information necessary for veterans to make informed decisions about how 
to find education, training, and employment opportunities. Two websites that 
speak to veterans specifically about cybersecurity opportunities are the National 
Security Agency’s public facing website and the DHS National Initiative for 
Cybersecurity Careers and Studies (NICCS) website. 
1. NSA 
The NSA website discusses the general benefits of VA career transition to 
federal service, including benefits, leave accrual, credit towards retirement for 
time served in uniform and veterans preference points applied to the federal 
hiring process. Table 4 gives the details of veterans preference eligibility 
categories and required documentation.  
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Eligibility Title Eligibility 
Points 
Document Required 
Preference Eligible with no 
disability 
5 Points DD214 
Preference Eligible with non-
compensated disability rating 
less than 10% 
10 Points DD214, application for 10 pt Veterans’ 
Preference, completed SF15 with 
supporting documentation 
Preference Eligible with 
disability rating of at least 
10% but less than 30% 
10 Points DD214, application for 10 pt Veterans’ 
Preference, completed SF15 with 
supporting documentation 
Preference Eligible with 
disability rating of 30% or 
more 
10 Points DD214, application for 10 pt Veterans’ 
Preference, completed SF15 with 
supporting documentation 
Derived Preference 10 Points DD214, application for 10 pt Veterans’ 
Preference, completed SF15 with 
supporting documentation 
Table 4.   Veteran’s Preference Eligibility, from [33] 
The website further describes general available career fields, the 
necessary qualifications, and provides resources for resume writing. There are 
also hyperlinks to open job announcements for entry-level positions. There are 
general references to the skills learned while serving in uniform, but no specific 
mention of what those skills are or how they apply to work in cybersecurity [33].  
2. DHS 
The DHS NICCS website for veterans provides external references for two 
categories of information. The Education section provides six separate sources 
of education for veterans, and the Career section provides eight separate 
resources for discovering employment opportunities. Both sections contain links 
to generalized information and links that very specifically discuss options tailored 
to cybersecurity education and roles [34]. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This section discussed available options in the commercial sector for 
training programs and certifications in cybersecurity skills. There are programs 
designed to train cyber warriors to perform a variety of roles serving the cyber 
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mission. Further, there are several initiatives administered by the federal 
government to inform the nation about the need for people willing to serve the 
nation in cybersecurity professional roles. Information is being jointly shared by 
DHS, NSA, and other federal executive branch departments and agencies in an 
effort to recruit talent. Veterans are targeted with specialized information related 
to the hiring process to become a civil servant. In the next chapter, this 
information will be combined with the previous three chapters into a 
recommendation for how the federal government could improve the information 
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V. INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK AND SUMMARY  
After identification and examination of the contents of the preceding 
chapters, this chapter will thread all of the information together into a 
recommended training framework. This recommendation will include 
identification of partnerships amongst federal departments that can create a 
viable path from service in a combat role to employment in a cybersecurity career 
field.  
A. CONNECT THE DOTS 
Chapter II reviewed the security concepts employed by forward operating 
bases and combat outposts including exposition of doctrinal concepts through 
the real-world example of the CO Keating in Afghanistan. Chapter III discussed 
the security concepts of computer network security with examples from federal, 
military and academic sources. Chapter IV combined combat and cybersecurity 
by identifying basic security concepts that bridge the two domains and discussed 
how federal cyber positions are defined with specific skill sets. The skills required 
for those jobs were then traced to the cybersecurity roles in chapter three, and 
linked back to physical security concepts. Finally, Chapter V surveyed a number 
of available commercial certifications and training programs that can provide the 
technical skills necessary to begin a career as a cyber professional. Those skills 
are validated by attainment of the associated commercial certifications.  
The first security concept from studying forward operating bases and 
combat outposts is the concept of Demarcation of the Defended Area. A 
perimeter is a simple structure used to outline the area of the base and provides 
protection in the form of physical shielding. Networked computer systems also 
employ perimeters in the form of network boundaries. IT professionals that are 
capable of building a network boundary are required to have detailed knowledge 
of networking concepts and their implementations via network protocols. The 
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training required to attain the CompTIA Network+ certification will provide the 
technical skills necessary to establish a secure boundary for a computer network.  
The second security concept discussed in Chapter II was a controlled 
ingress and egress inspection point to allow only approved traffic to enter and 
leave the forward operating base and combat outpost. Vehicles and personnel 
are inspected for explosives or contraband prior to accessing an entry control 
point. The rate of speed on approach to the entry control point may be physically 
restricted by serpentine barriers. Only after the inspection is complete is access 
granted through the entry control point and through the perimeter into the base. 
Firewalls provide similar functionality for a network boundary by only allowing 
certain types of network traffic into or through a network DMZ for use or 
inspection. IT professionals require specialized training to apply the security 
concept of controlled ingress and egress through establishment of a DMZ and 
configuration of firewalls. CompTIA certifications such as A+ and Security+ 
validate the necessary skills for configuring firewalls to serve as entry control 
points. Further training in Server+ and Linux+ validates the skills required to 
configure servers and maintain services inside a DMZ that provide secure access 
to data on the network.  
The next two security concepts pertain to monitoring activity within and 
approaching the perimeter. Monitoring is achieved through manned and 
unmanned capabilities. The unmanned capabilities within the Combat Outpost 
scenario involve ground sensors placed outside the perimeter to detect 
movement and inform personnel inside the Tactical Operations Center. In some 
cases, sensors can be automatically linked to weapons systems that translate 
the sensor data into targeting data and engage the target to defeat it. 
Cybersecurity professionals, working in network operations centers and security 
operations centers employ intrusion detection systems and intrusion prevention 
systems that feed network data back to a security incident event manager. The 
security incident event manager can correlate the sensor data and provide 
preliminary analysis to the cybersecurity personnel who then decide what course 
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of action to take in defense of the network. Intrusion prevention systems can 
automatically detect and defeat many network threats without specific human 
supervision. The skills required to configure unmanned monitoring systems for 
computer networks include the ability to conduct vulnerability analysis and to 
perform intrusion detection and response. These skills are taught as part of the 
training required to achieve the CompTIA Security+ certification.  
Manned monitoring of a forward operating base or combat outpost relies 
on personnel in a tactical operations center constantly assessing the situation 
presented to them by the data from sensors, cameras, and information feeds. 
Patrols require personnel to physically patrol the perimeter or assigned area and 
assess any situations that occur in their area of responsibility. Network 
operations center and security operations center cybersecurity professionals face 
a similar challenge to constantly observe behavior on the network. They must be 
able to analyze the data presented to them via monitoring tools and take action 
to address anomalous behavior. These professionals require skills in a variety of 
computer analysis areas such as vulnerability, malicious code, low level protocol, 
and packet analysis. They must also be able to administer a network and the 
various operating systems of the machines hosted on that network. The skills 
required for a career in a network operations center or security operations center 
align with those required by certifications such as a CISSP, GCIA, or ENSA. 
The final three security concepts are associated with what is being 
protected within the perimeter. Buildings within a perimeter on a forward 
operating bases and combat outposts can serve a variety of purposes, but all of 
them require balancing requirements for mission accomplishment against 
security requirements. Living quarters and work quarters (e.g., a tactical 
operations center) require protection from incoming attack but must also support 
timely access between facilities. Ammunition and fuel stores must also be 
protected from incoming attacks but must be located a minimum standoff 
distance from the living quarters to minimize the effect of unintentional detonation 
of the ammunition or fuel as well. Similar concepts are employed when designing 
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and implementing secure networks. When data storage is required on a network, 
data access must be both available and secure. When that data involves 
personally identifiable information, it must be encrypted when stored. Mission 
data must also be protected in accordance with its sensitivity and usage. 
Cybersecurity professionals who support these tasks must have experience in 
managing and implementing common operating systems and network 
infrastructures. These skills can be trained and validated through attainment of 
several CompTIA certifications including A+, Server+, Linux+, and Security+.  
This document establishes a framework to identify a transition path from 
combat to cybersecurity. The framework identifies the security concepts 
associated with forward deployed service at a forward operating base or combat 
outpost and provides evidence that they provide a solid security foundation that 
can translate to cybersecurity through a targeted training approach. Furthermore, 
the technical skills needed to fill the gap for veterans with this experience are 
readily available through commercial training and certifications. Table 5 is a 
consolidated reference for mapping the discussion of this document into one 
digest view. 
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Table 5.   Full Concept Map from Security Concept to Relevant Cyber Training 
B. WHERE TO NEXT? 
There are several agencies within the executive branch of the federal 
government that can enable and benefit from an effective pipeline of veterans 
into the civilian workforce. NICE review of the framework proposed here can form 
the basis for establishing or improving partnerships amongst the DOD, VA, DOJ 
and DHS to strengthen career development programs that focus on veterans 
transitioning from active duty to federal service. Further research and pilot 
activities can be conducted to validate findings and incorporate this training into 
transition assistance programs for separating service members to educate them 
about available options in the cybersecurity mission space. Towards this end, a 
training program should be developed based on this material and delivered to a 
group of combat veterans. Pilot program subjects can be identified through 
polling to concentrate on those veterans most interested in cybersecurity or 
computer technology who also possess confidence in being able to perform 
cybersecurity work. Reconducting the poll at the conclusion of the training can 
provide quantitative and qualitative evidence of improvements in student 
potential for a cybersecurity careers after military service.  
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The DOD is primarily responsible for national defense and invests heavily 
in training its Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines in the finest leadership, 
situational awareness, and technical training available. DOD has a large civilian 
workforce as well that operates side-by-side with military personnel, especially in 
the cyber area. In particular, DOD runs several large cyber oriented 
organizations such as the United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and 
Defense Cyber Crimes Center (DC3) that employ large military and civilian 
workforces. 
The DHS is responsible for coordination of national resources in a time of 
emergency. DHS operates several cyber organizations, such as the National 
Cyber Coordination and Integration Center (NCICC) which is comprised of 
several elements including both the United States Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team (US-CERT) and the Industrial Controls Systems Computer 
Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT). DHS also operates the Homeland 
Security Investigations group, which is a law-enforcement agency responsible for 
areas of cyber crime focused on child exploitation. The U.S. Secret Service also 
operates under the DHS banner and is responsible for investigating cyber 
incidents related to its protective detail mission and financial crimes 
responsibilities (e.g., fraud).  
The DOJ is responsible for law enforcement within the United States for 
cyber crimes. They prosecute all manner of computer crime in partnership with 
the rest of the government. Like the departments mentioned above, DOJ 
operates more than one organization in the cyber domain. The Computer Crime 
& Intellectual Property section (CCIPS) is responsible for implementing the 
department’s national strategies for combating computer crimes. The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, on the other hand, has a cyber crime section that deals 
in key priority areas like computer and network intrusions, identity theft, and 
fraud. 
The VA operates the nation’s programs to provide services for America’s 
veterans. America’s service men and women are entitled to a lifetime of care and 
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benefits, including health, training, and education. The VA can be a conduit to 
extend any training program to this nation’s veterans who have already 
separated from military service and would be interested in entering civil service in 
cybersecurity roles. While the VA has an internal cybersecurity role through their 
own Network Operations Center and Security Operations Center (NOC/SOC) 
personnel, its role in this partnership centers around the dedicated access to 
veterans. 
C. SUMMARY 
Combat veterans deserve every opportunity to continue service or gain 
employment after their military careers. They may not see a computer- or 
technology-heavy career field as a viable option due to lack of technical skills in 
that area. Providing a path for veterans to see how their skill sets can be applied 
to cybersecurity along with a viable means to receive the training necessary in 
the technical areas they lack is an important step. The federal cyber workforce is 
growing at all levels and would benefit from an influx of talent that understands 
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